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THE DECISION TO AWARD
PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise,
Nicole L. Waters, and Martin T. Wells1
ABSTRACT
Empirical studies have consistently shown that punitive damages are rarely
awarded, with rates of about 3 to 5 percent of plaintiff trial wins. Using the 2005
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Civil Justice Survey, this article shows
that knowing in which cases plaintiffs sought punitive damages transforms the pic-
ture of punitive damages. Not accounting for whether punitive damages were
sought obscures the meaningful punitive damages rate, the rate of awards in
cases in which they were sought, by a factor of nearly 10, and obfuscates a more
explicable pattern of awards than has been reported. Punitive damages were sur-
prisingly infrequently sought, with requests found in about 10 percent of tried cases
that plaintiffs won. State laws restricting access to punitive damages were signifi-
cantly associated with rates of seeking punitive damages. Punitive damages were
awarded in about 30 percent of the plaintiff trial wins in which they were sought.
Awards were most frequent in cases of intentional tort, with a punitive award
rate of over 60 percent. Greater harm corresponded to a greater probability of
an award: the size of the compensatory award was significantly associated with
whether punitive damages were awarded, with a rate of approximately 60 percent
for cases with compensatory awards of $1 million or more. Regression models cor-
rectly classify about 70 percent or more of the punitive award request outcomes.
1 Eisenberg is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences,
Cornell University; Heise is Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Waters is Senior Court
Research Associate, National Center for State Courts; Wells is Charles A. Alexander Professor
of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University, Professor of Clinical Epidemiology and Health
Services Research, Cornell University Weill Medical College. The data analyzed here were
gathered under a grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and are archived at the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts,
2005, Study No. 23862. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not those of
either the National Center for State Courts or of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Earlier ver-
sions of this paper were presented at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Goods, Bonn, Germany, at the 2009 meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools,
and at the Poster Session of the 2009 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University
of Southern California, Gould School of Law. Eisenberg has analyzed the 2005 Civil Justice
Survey data in connection with an expert report for the estate of a plaintiff with a possible
punitive damages claim.
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Judge-jury differences in the rate of awards exist, with judges awarding punitive
damages at a higher rate in personal injury cases and juries awarding them at a
higher rate in nonpersonal injury cases. These puzzling adjudicator differences
may be a consequence of the routing of different cases to judges and juries.
1. INTRODUCTION
1 Two major questions about punitive damages are whether they will be
awarded and, if awarded, what their amount will be. The amount of puni-
tive damages awarded has been consistently, successfully modeled as a
function of the compensatory award.2 But models of whether punitive
damages are awarded have been less successful in explaining the pattern
of awards. This is because punitive damages are rarely awarded (Eisenberg
et al. 2006), and rare events can be difficult to model. Studies spanning a
decade show that plaintiffs receive punitive awards in about 3 to 5 percent
of cases they win, with the rate noticeably higher in financial injury cases.3
Studies also suggest that when punitive damages are awarded, they tend to
be awarded in appropriate cases (Antolini 2004, 210–211; Koenig & Rustad
2001, 1995). But only marginal additional insight has been gained into
whether punitive damages will be awarded.
2 A limitation of most prior punitive damages studies is the absence of
information about whether punitive damages were requested. An impor-
tant data set from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) allows fuller exploration of whether puni-
tive damages will be awarded. The data set, which consists of civil trials
concluded in 156 counties in 2005, is the fourth in the NCSC-BJS series
of Civil Justice Surveys dating back to cases terminated in 1991–1992.
In the 2005 iteration, the survey added a variable that recorded whether
punitive damages were sought.
3 This single additional variable has opened the curtain on the rate at
which punitive damages are awarded to an unprecedented extent. It
enables us to provide the first large-study insight into the rate at which
punitive damages were sought in tried cases. The rate, about 10 percent,
is much lower than many have believed. In tried cases in which punitive
2 See Eisenberg et al. 2006; Eisenberg et al. 1997; Hyman et al. 2007, table 6, model 2; Karpoff &
Lott 1999; Moller, Pace, & Carroll 1999; Schlanger 2003, 1605 & n. 136; Choi & Eisenberg
2009.
3 E.g., Eisenberg et al. 2006. Financial injury cases refer to cases other than personal injury cases.
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damages were sought, and in which plaintiffs established liability at trial,
punitive damages were not rarely awarded. They were awarded in 35.5
percent (28.5 percent weighted4) of cases won by plaintiffs in which puni-
tive damages were sought. This contrasts sharply with the 3 to 5 percent
rate in cases won by plaintiffs, not filtered by whether punitive damages
were sought. The obvious importance of whether punitive damages were
sought requires reassessing the factors associated with requesting and
receiving punitive damages. We find that the award of punitive damages
is significantly associated with the level of the compensatory award. For
compensatory award cases exceeding $1 million, won by plaintiffs with
punitive damages requested, the punitive damages award rate exceeded
50 percent. The rate is also sensitive to case category and varies across
judge and jury trials. Judges award punitive damages at a greater rate in
personal injury trials and juries award them at a greater rate in
nonpersonal injury trials.
4Part 2 of this article first echoes speculation about the rate at which
punitive damages would be sought and then reviews prior findings with
respect to the rate of seeking and obtaining punitive damages. Part 3
describes the relevant aspects of the 2005 Civil Justice Survey and reports
our core results. Part 4 seeks to explain the pattern of punitive awards as a
function of case category, locale, level of compensatory award, propensity
to seek punitive awards, and mode of trial. Part 5 discusses the results and
Part 6 concludes.
2. EXPECTATIONS ABOUT PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
AND PRIOR STUDIES THAT ACCOUNTED FOR WHETHER
PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE SOUGHT
5Conversations with colleagues yielded estimates that plaintiffs would be
observed to have sought punitive damages in nearly every case. ‘‘Just
throw the allegation into the complaint.’’ ‘‘It can’t hurt.’’ ‘‘Malpractice
not to do so.’’ Some of these reactions were from highly experienced teach-
ers of civil procedure. These estimates may have been informed by George
Priest’s 1996 study of three small Alabama counties, conducted in con-
nection with litigation, that reported punitive damages claims in over
4 Weighted results refer to rates that account for the sample design, which overrsampled cases
from large counties relative to cases from smaller counties, as explained below.
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70 percent of tort claims in the early 1990s (Priest 1996, 827–828),5 a rate
that, as far as we can ascertain, has not been replicated in other published
studies. The Priest study did not report the rate at which plaintiffs were
granted punitive damages.
6 In reviewing the literature, we found no prior multi-jurisdiction broad-
based study that assessed punitive damage award rates in light of the rate at
which punitive damages were sought. But, in addition to the Priest study,
some prior locale-specific or subject-specific studies do provide useful
background results related to this study. The prior studies’ patterns of
results highlight the importance of carefully tracking what cases are
included in the calculation of punitive award rates and requests.
7 Using a Florida jury verdict reporter database available via Westlaw,
Vidmar and Rose (2001) studied punitive damages awards in Florida
from 1989 to 1998. They gathered information on whether punitive dam-
ages were submitted to the jury and, if they were, whether the jury awarded
punitive damages. Table 1 reproduces the relevant table from their work.
The column labeled ‘‘Number of Cases’’ is ‘‘the total number of punitive
damage claims between 1989 and 1998 that were put to a jury,’’ while
the column labeled ‘‘Number with Non-Zero Awards’’ reports ‘‘the number
and percentage of times that the jury returned a punitive award’’ (Vidmar &
Rose 2001, 492–493).
8 Punitive damages awards were common in cases in which the issue of
punitive damages was submitted to juries. The table’s last row shows
that, over the course of a decade, the possibility of punitive damages was
submitted to juries in an average of 23.2 cases per year, and that juries
awarded punitive damages in an average of 20.8 of those cases per year.
This is an overall average of punitive damages being awarded when sub-
mitted in 89.7 percent of cases.
9 David Baldus, John MacQueen, and George Woodworth used ‘‘pub-
lished sources, e.g., the West Reporting System, Westlaw, Lexis, legal trea-
tises, and national jury verdict reporters’’ to report on medical liability
cases involving ‘‘116 plaintiffs who sought punitive damages against health
care provider defendants’’ (1995, 1113–1114 n. 3, 1156). Punitive damages
were awarded in 88 of the 116 cases, or 76 percent. Punitive damages were
awarded in 10 cases in which courts later ruled they were inappropriately
5 The data were reported to have been collected ‘‘for the case Gallant v. Prudential.’’ Priest 1996,
828 n.16.
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given. The study included 32 states and 24 percent of the cases were prior
to 1980 (Baldus, MacQueen, & Woodworth 1995, 1114–1115 n. 3).
10Neil Vidmar’s book (1995) on medical malpractice provides additional
insight into the rate of punitive awards in medical malpractice cases. The
book reports on 895 medical malpractice cases in North Carolina for the
period July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1987 and, for 14 North Carolina counties,
326 medical malpractice cases from July 1, 1987 to December 31, 1990.
Vidmar reports that 17 of 84 cases that went to trial resulted in wins for
plaintiffs in the 1984–1987 study and that four of 25 cases that went to
trial resulted in wins for plaintiffs in the 1987–1990 study (1995, 23, 25).
Therefore, in the combined sample, plaintiffs won 21 tried cases. Punitive
damages were reportedly sought in 27 percent of the cases that went to
trial (Vidmar 1995, 56). Punitive damages were thus sought in 27 percent
of 109 cases, or 29 cases that went to trial. Since plaintiffs won 21 of 109
cases, or 19.3 percent of trials, one might estimate that 19.3 percent of the
29 tried cases in which punitive damages were sought resulted in plaintiff
wins. (This assumes that the plaintiff win rate is not materially different
between tried cases in which punitive damages were sought and tried cases
in which they were not sought.) That is five to six cases. The North Carolina
study further reports that two jury verdicts of the estimated five or six cases
Table 1. Table from Vidmar-Rose Reporting Rate of Punitive Awards in Florida Cases
in Which Punitive Awards Issue Was Submitted to Juries
Year
Number of
Cases
Number with
Non-Zero Awards
Median Ratio of Punitive
to Compensatory Damages
1989 32 27 (84%) 0.46:1
1990 27 26 (96%) 0.17:1
1991 28 25 (89%) 0.83:1
1992 22 19 (86%) 0.52:1
1993 21 19 (90%) 0.55:1
1994 27 26 (96%) 0.93:1
1995 15 13 (87%) 0.92:1
1996 17 17 (100%) 1.13:1
1997 21 17 (81%) 0.40:1
1998 22 19 (86%) 0.90:1
As of 1998 23.2/year 20.8/year 0.67:1
Source: Vidmar & Rose 2001, based on Westlaw Florida jury verdict reports.
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resulted in punitive damages awards (Vidmar 1995, 254). So approximately
40 percent (two of five) or 33 percent (two of six) of the tried North Carolina
cases that requested punitive damages awards resulted in such awards.
11 Denise Antolini used a personal injury judgments reporter to study
punitive damages cases in Hawaii from 1985 to 2001 (2004, 210–211).6
The study purported to examine ‘‘the complete universe of 2,250 state
and federal tort judgments in Hawaii from 1985 to 2001, which produced
sixty-three punitive damages judgments’’ (Antolini 2004, 157). The pub-
lisher of the verdict reporter, ‘‘personally reviews the judgment books in
the U.S. District Court and the State Circuit Courts each month’’ (Antolini
2004, 212). Plaintiffs requested punitive damages in a little more than one-
third of the reported tort cases. Request rates ranged ‘‘from an annual high
of 59.46% in 1988 to an annual low of 23.08% in 1989. the mean annual
request rate was 37.14%, and the annual median was 37.04%’’ (Antolini
2004, 221).7 The request rate varied by case forum. Punitive damages were
requested in about 37 percent of all state court judgments reported, in 15 per-
cent of all Court Annexed Arbitration Program (CAAP) awards reported,
and in 43 percent of federal court judgments (Antolini 2004, 220). Antolini
also reports that punitive damages were awarded in state court in 13.65 per-
cent of the cases, in the CAAP in 8.39 percent of the cases, and in federal
court in 6.61 percent of the cases (Antolini 2004, 224–225). If we crudely
assume that punitive damages were requested at the same rate in successful
and unsuccessful cases, which is a reasonable assumption based on the
Bureau of Justice Statistics data described below, then state court cases
yielded punitive awards in 13.65/37, or 37 percent of cases in which they
were requested, CAAP cases yielded punitive awards in 8.39/15, or 56 percent
of cases in which they were requested, and federal courts yielded punitive
awards in 6.61/43, or 15 percent of cases in which they were requested.
12 Thomas Eaton, David Mustard, and Susette Talarico (2005) provided
rare empirical data about the rate at which punitive damages were sought
in the mass of cases and not just those cases that reached trial or judgment.
They did not rely on available opinions or verdict reporters but scrutinized
6 The database for the Hawaii study was based on Neal Seamon’s Personal Injury Judgments
Hawaii, which contained ‘‘all final judgments in personal injury and related tort actions filed
in the state circuit court and the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, except for class
action cases, asbestos, and toxic tort cases’’ (Antolini 2004, 210).
7 The trend in frequency of requests was downward over time (Antolini 2004, 221).
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actual records. They studied over 25,000 tort cases from six Georgia coun-
ties covering a period of four years. Punitive damages were sought in 3,729
cases of 25,562 cases, or 14.7 percent of the total (Eaton, Mustard, & Talar-
ico 2005, 345, 352). As noted above, Antolini’s Hawaii data on cases reach-
ing judgment indicate that punitive damages were requested in about 15
percent of all awards reported in the CAAP, 22.4 percent of all state tort
judgments (state court and CAAP combined), 37 percent of all state
court only judgments, and 43 percent of federal court cases (2004, 220).
The higher Hawaii rates may be attributable to a less comprehensive sam-
ple than in Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico, and a sample dominated by cases
reaching judgment.
13A 1996 Pacific Research Institute study of one month of lawsuits filed in
San Francisco County assessed 1,015 suits. Punitive damages were
requested in 14 percent of the suits, and in 27 percent of the suits that
the author deemed to conceivably involve a punitive award (Hayward
1996). A study of over 3,000 filings in 1995–1996 in four California coun-
ties, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Joaquin, and Sacramento, found punitive
damages claim rates ranging from 9 percent in actions against individuals
in cases filed in San Joaquin County to 60 percent in actions against gov-
ernments in San Diego County (Sullivan 1997). The study does not report
sufficient information to compute overall rates at which punitive damages
were sought.
14Table 2 summarizes the prior literature on punitive damages summa-
rized here. Panel A summarizes studies reporting the rate at which punitive
damages were sought. Panel B summarizes studies reporting the rate at
which punitive damages were awarded at trial, conditional on punitive
damages having been sought.
3. DATA USED IN THIS STUDY AND CORE RESULTS
3.1. The Data
15The data for this study come from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts,
an NCSC-BJS project that has so far yielded four major datasets.
The Civil Justice Survey gathers data directly from state court clerks’ offi-
ces on tort, contract, and property cases disposed of by trial in fiscal year
1991–1992 and in calendar years 1996, 2001, and 2005. Each of these
time periods corresponds to a separate BJS data set. The first three data-
sets covered state courts of general jurisdiction in a random sample of
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Table 2. Literature Addressing Rate at Which Punitive Damages Were Sought & Rate
at Which Punitive Damages Were Awarded at Trial, Conditional on Being Sought
A. Rate at Which Punitive Damages Were Sought
Study Time period Data
Rate at which PD
sought
Priest 1996 1992–1994
Records in 3 small
AL ctys.
w70%
Vidmar 1995
1984–87,
1987–90
NC medical trials 27%
Antolini 2004 1985–2001
HI verdict reporter
tort judgments
37% (state ct.), 15%
(ct. annexed arb.),
43% (fed. ct.)
Hayward 1996 1991 (1 month)
San Francisco Cty.,
1,024 filings
14% (all filings) or
27%
(tortþ contract)
Sullivan 1997 1996–96
4 CA ctys., 3,825
filings
9%–26% (individual
dfts.), 28%–50%
(business dfts.),
28%–60%
(government dfts.)
Eaton et al. 2005 1994–97
6 GA ctys., 25,562
tort filings
14.7%
B. Rate at Which Punitive Damages Were Awarded at Trial, Conditional on Being Sought
Study Time period Data
N of cases PD
sought/
awarded
Rate of PD
awards
Vidmar, Rose
2001
1989–98
FL jury trial
reports
23.2/20.8 per
yr.
89%
Baldus et al.
1995
24% are
pre-1980
Medical trials;
published
sources
116/88 76%
Vidmar 1995
1984–87,
1987–90
NC medical
trials
5 or 6/2 40% or 33%
Antolini 2004 1985–2001
HI verdict
reporter tort
judgments
?/63 (2,250
judgments)
37% (state ct.),
56% (ct.
annexed arb.),
15% (fed. ct.)
Abbreviations: arb.¼ arbitration, Cty.¼County, ctys.¼ counties, ct.¼ court, dfts.¼ defendants,
fed.¼ federal, PD¼ punitive damages. Sources: see reference entries for authors listed in table.
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46 of the 75 most populous counties in the United States. The 2001 Civil
Justice Survey data included 46 counties; the 1991–1992 and 1996 data
included 45.8
16The 2005 Civil Justice Survey data included 156 counties and are the
data used here. The 2005 survey included 46 of the 75 most populous
counties selected to maintain backwards compatibility with the earlier
Civil Justice Surveys. The 2005 survey expanded coverage by adding 110
counties to represent the 3,066 smaller counties not included in the coun-
try’s 75 largest counties.9 The 2005 data included all completed trials in
the studied counties. Unlike the earlier datasets, the 2005 data included
a variable that reported whether punitive damages had been sought in
each case. The 2005 data include 8,872 trials of an estimated total of
27,128 in state courts in the United States in 2005, or 32.7 percent.
Based on the sample design, the trials from the 46 counties are estimated
to represent 10,813 general bench and civil trials disposed of in the nation’s
75 most populous counties. Trials from the 110 smaller counties are esti-
mated to represent 16,315 general civil and bench trials from outside the
nation’s 75 most populous counties (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2008;
authors’ calculations).
17One important limitation of the data should be noted. The coding of
whether punitive damages were sought was based on an ex post reading
of the case files and not on observing what issues were in fact submitted
to adjudicators. Documents in the file, such as the complaint, were
reviewed for mention of punitive damages. If punitive damages were men-
tioned in a document suggesting that they had been sought, they were
coded as having been sought. But the data do not allow assessing whether
a punitive claim was in fact submitted to the judge or jury as fact-finder.
Thus, if a punitive claim were included in the complaint, but dismissed
8 One county included in the 1991–1992 and 1996 study, Norfolk, Massachusetts, fell out the
nation’s 75 most populous in the 2000 census and was replaced by Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina, and El Paso County, Texas. Two Maryland counties declined to participate
in the 1991–1992 study, and were replaced with Fairfax County for all three iterations of the
Civil Justice Survey.
For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics (1995, 1996, &
2004). The initial Civil Justice Survey dataset (1991–1992) includes only jury trials. The two
subsequent datasets, 1996 and 2001, include jury and bench trials. The three datasets include
all completed trials in all three years in most of the counties.
9 For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics 2008; Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research 2009.
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on summary judgment before reaching the jury, the data coded punitive
damages as having been sought. This leads the models estimating whether
punitive damages were awarded to be conservative. Since punitive damages
were sought in all the cases we code as having resulted in a punitive award,
the positive punitive damages outcomes would not change. But some of
the negative punitive damages outcomes are false negatives in that the
jury could not have awarded punitive damages because the issue was not
submitted to the jury. Thus, our estimates of the rates at which adjudica-
tors awarded punitive damages, conditional on their being sought, are
conservatively low.
3.2. The Rate of Seeking Punitive Damages
18 Table 3 reports, by case category, the percent of all trials in which punitive
damages were sought, the percent of all trials won by plaintiffs in which
punitive damages were sought, and the percent of trials in which punitive
damages were awarded, conditional on plaintiffs having sought punitive
damages and prevailed at trial. The overall rates are surprisingly low.
The table’s first two columns show that seeking punitive damages is not
very common in cases that reach trial. In no case category did plaintiffs
seek punitive damages in as high a rate as 40 percent of trials.10 And the
overall rate for all trials was 9.0 percent.
19 Plaintiffs sought punitive damages in only 10.2 percent of the trials they
won, not strikingly different from the 9.0 percent rate in all trials. These
figures increase to 11.5 percent and 13.1 percent, respectively, if one uses
probability weights to account for the different numbers of cases repre-
sented by the large and small county samples. The rate is somewhat
depressed by the large motor vehicle category. Excluding motor vehicle
cases, plaintiffs sought punitive damages in 398 of 2,768 trials they won,
or 14.4 percent, which increases to 17.6 percent if one accounts for the
sample design using probability weights. The table shows substantial het-
erogeneity across case categories. If one separates judge and jury trials,
plaintiffs sought punitive damages in 9.3 percent (11.0 percent weighted)
of judge-tried cases they won and 10.6 percent (14.1 percent weighted) of
jury-tried cases they won.
10 The rate slightly exceeded 40 percent for ‘‘employment discrimination’’ and ‘‘intentional tort/
tortious interference’’ when the data are weighted to reflect the differential sampling of large
and small counties.
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Table 3. Rates of Seeking and Obtaining Punitive Damages, by Case Category
Case category
All trials
Trials won by
plaintiffs
Trials won by
plaintiffs,
punitives sought
Percent
with
punitives
sought
N
Percent
with
punitives
sought
N
Percent
with
punitive
award
N
Slander, libel,
defamation
38.9% 54 55.2% 29 60.0% 15
Employment -
discrimination
32.8% 131 41.3% 63 25.0% 24
Intentional/
tortious
interference
32.4% 74 33.3% 48 43.8% 16
Conversion 26.9% 78 26.1% 46 66.7% 12
Employment –
other
25.7% 183 26.0% 100 38.5% 26
False arrest/
imprisonment
25.0% 24 0.0% 6 — 0
Fraud 24.8% 479 30.9% 278 39.3% 84
Intentional tort 23.6% 259 32.0% 128 65.8% 38
Other/unknown
real property
20.6% 34 — 0 — 0
Partnership
dispute
18.6% 43 24.2% 33 37.5% 8
Other/unknown
contract/
commercial
18.1% 94 22.0% 59 38.5% 13
Buyer plaintiff
(contract)
13.9% 631 16.4% 384 27.4% 62
Title or boundary
dispute
12.9% 171 — 0 — 0
Animal attack 12.5% 48 16.7% 36 0.0% 6
Malpractice -
other prof’l
11.7% 77 8.1% 37 33.3% 3
Prod. liability –
asbestos
11.3% 53 7.1% 28 100.0% 1
Prod. liability –
other
10.7% 122 2.6% 39 0.0% 1
(continued)
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20 Table 4 shows, now subdivided by locale, the same information as Table
3: the rate at which punitive damages were sought for all trials, the rate at
which they were sought in plaintiff wins, and the rate at which they were
awarded when plaintiffs won at trial. The table treats as a single locale the
110 smaller counties not in the core Civil Justice Survey group of 46 large
counties.
21 Both the mean and the median seeking rates, across the 47 locales, are
less than 10 percent of all trials. In two counties (Santa Clara and Fulton),
both with relatively few trials, the rate exceeded 30 percent. In seven addi-
tional counties, the rate exceeded 20 percent. Four of those counties, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Franklin, and Fairfax, had more than 100 trials.
Table 3. (Continued)
Case category
All trials
Trials won by
plaintiffs
Trials won by
plaintiffs,
punitives sought
Percent
with
punitives
sought
N
Percent
with
punitives
sought
N
Percent
with
punitive
award
N
Other negilgent
act/unknown tort
9.9% 202 10.6% 104 36.4% 11
Rental/lease
agreement
8.2% 184 7.2% 125 44.4% 9
Subrogation 7.4% 27 11.8% 17 50.0% 2
Malpractice -
medical/dental
5.9% 972 7.4% 203 30.8% 13
Seller plaintiff
(contract)
5.3% 873 4.8% 642 20.0% 30
Motor vehicle tort 3.3% 2,931 3.7% 1,778 20.3% 64
Premises liability 2.7% 853 2.9% 341 20.0% 10
Eminent domain/
condemnation
0.0% 73 — 0 — 0
Mortgage
foreclosure
0.0% 31 0.0% 22 — 0
Total 9.0% 8,701 10.2% 4,546 35.5% 448
Note.Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were sought in all trials, the rate at which
punitive damages were sought in trials won by plaintiffs, and the rate at which punitive dam-
ages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. Source.
NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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Table 4. Rates of Seeking and Obtaining Punitive Damages, by Locale
Site
All trials
Trials won
by plaintiffs
Trials won
by plaintiffs,
punitives sought
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitive
award
N
Maricopa, AZ 10.3% 252 14.7% 116 23.5% 17
Pima, AZ 5.1% 79 6.5% 46 33.3% 3
Alameda, CA 16.1% 174 19.6% 97 52.6% 19
Contra Costa, CA 22.2% 27 33.3% 9 33.3% 3
Fresno, CA 1.9% 52 2.9% 35 0.0% 1
Los Angeles, CA 27.2% 379 32.3% 186 28.8% 59
Orange, CA 19.5% 272 24.8% 129 31.3% 32
San Bernardino,
CA
17.4% 69 15.4% 39 0.0% 6
San Francisco,
CA
21.7% 120 19.0% 63 41.7% 12
Santa Clara, CA 31.5% 54 36.0% 25 44.4% 9
Ventura, CA 15.4% 78 11.4% 35 75.0% 4
Fairfield, CT 6.9% 72 2.1% 48 100.0% 1
Hartford, CT 7.6% 79 4.5% 44 0.0% 2
Dade, FL 5.1% 195 4.2% 119 60.0% 5
Orange, FL 2.9% 70 5.6% 36 0.0% 1
Palm Beach, FL 1.7% 116 2.7% 73 50.0% 2
Fulton, GA 32.5% 40 45.5% 22 20.0% 10
Honolulu, HI 22.2% 18 30.0% 10 0.0% 3
Cook, IL 1.8% 675 2.7% 365 50.0% 10
DuPage, IL 12.3% 81 13.2% 53 42.9% 7
Marion, IN 1.6% 127 2.4% 85 0.0% 2
Jefferson, KY 5.5% 110 13.3% 45 50.0% 6
Essex, MA 1.8% 56 6.3% 16 100.0% 1
Middlesex, MA 2.0% 99 0.0% 27 — 0
Suffolk, MA 0.8% 121 2.8% 36 100.0% 1
Worcester, MA 0.0% 73 0.0% 18 — 0
Oakland, MI 2.0% 149 1.4% 74 — 0
(continued)
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Table 4. (Continued)
Site
All trials
Trials won
by plaintiffs
Trials won
by plaintiffs,
punitives sought
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitive
award
N
Wayne, MI 0.0% 179 0.0% 69 — 0
Hennepin, MN 3.4% 179 5.3% 95 33.3% 3
St. Louis, MO 15.7% 140 13.4% 82 54.5% 11
Bergen, NJ 6.2% 161 7.0% 57 0.0% 4
Essex, NJ 3.0% 134 3.3% 61 50.0% 2
Middlesex, NJ 3.7% 219 3.7% 81 33.3% 3
New York, NY 4.7% 340 4.4% 160 16.7% 6
Cuyahoga, OH 5.7% 227 4.8% 124 83.3% 6
Franklin, OH 29.8% 131 20.4% 93 44.4% 18
Allegheny, PA 2.7% 220 4.3% 115 100.0% 3
Philadelphia, PA 4.1% 610 4.5% 356 18.8% 16
Bexar, TX 23.7% 76 39.4% 33 46.2% 13
Dallas, TX 3.0% 203 2.4% 84 50.0% 2
Harris, TX 4.3% 506 5.7% 261 66.7% 15
Fairfax, VA 20.9% 163 22.8% 101 43.5% 23
King, WA 1.5% 199 1.6% 127 0.0% 2
Milwaukee, WI 3.8% 131 2.5% 79 100.0% 2
Mecklenburg, NC 17.9% 39 11.5% 26 0.0% 3
El Paso, TX 7.7% 39 11.1% 27 66.7% 3
Total large
counties
8.2% 7,533 9.3% 3,882 38.5% 351
smaller counties
(110)
14.1% 1,168 15.4% 664 24.7% 97
Total 9.0% 8,701 10.2% 4,546 35.5% 448
Note.Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were sought in all trials, the rate at which
punitive damages were sought in trials won by plaintiffs, and the rate at which punitive dam-
ages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. Source:
NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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In 21 counties, the rate was less than 5 percent but three of these counties
are in states that preclude or substantially constrain the award of punitive
damages.11
3.3. The Rate of Punitive Awards
22The last two columns in Tables 3 and 4 show that, in trials won by plaintiffs
in which they sought punitive damages, the overall rate at which punitive
damages were awarded was 35.5 percent. Accounting for the differential
sampling of large and small counties yields an overall rate of 28.5 percent.
These rates differ substantially from rates based on punitive awards in trials
won by plaintiffs that do not account for whether punitive damages were
sought. Since the tables’ middle two numerical columns show punitive
requests in only about 10 percent of plaintiff trial wins, failure to account
for whether punitive damages were sought could be viewed as misstating
the punitive damages award rate—the rate at which they are awarded
when sought—by about a factor of 10.
4. EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF PUNITIVE AWARDS
23This dramatic change requires reassessing previous findings about
punitive damages in light of the newly available information about
whether punitive damages were sought. We address the following top-
ics: (1) the relation between state law and the seeking rate, (2) the rela-
tion between case category and locale and the likelihood of award, (3)
the relation between the size of the compensatory award and the like-
lihood of a punitive award, (4) whether rates of punitive awards dif-
fered between judges and juries and between personal injury and
nonpersonal injury cases, and (5) whether the rate at which punitive
11 The low rate of seeking punitive awards in the two Michigan counties may be due to limita-
tions on punitive award availability in that state to merely punish. Michigan case law indicates
that damages may not be awarded to punish the defendant. E.g., Association Research and Dev.
Corp. v. CNA Fin. Corp., 333 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). But Michigan allows
‘‘exemplary’’ damages to compensate plaintiffs for their humiliation, outrage, and indignity
resulting from defendants’ willful, malicious, or wanton conduct. E.g., Kewin v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Mich. 1980); Hall v. Claya, 2008 WL 2779882 (Mich.
Ct. App. July 17, 2008); Association Research, supra, 333 N.W.2d at 211. The low rate of seek-
ing punitive awards in King County, Washington, may be due to the unavailability of punitive
damages under Washington law. Punitive damages are generally not allowed in Washington.
E.g.,McKee v. AT&T, 191 P.3d 845, 860 (Wash. 2008). State level results relating to the seeking
of punitive damages are discussed in Part 4.1 below.
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damages were awarded was associated with the rate at which they were
sought. We first explore these variables separately and then explore
them simultaneously in two classes of regression models. The first class
of models, which examines whether punitive damages were awarded,
includes only cases in which punitive damages were sought and plaintiffs
won at trial. The second class of models first models the selection process
leading to a request for punitive damages, including state regulation of
punitive damages, and assesses whether punitive damages were awarded
conditional on this selection process.
4.1. State Law and the Rate of Seeking Punitive Damages
24 At least two features of state law that we can account for can be expected
to influence whether punitive damages are sought. First is the set of
legal rules regulating the availability of punitive damages. For example,
if state law prohibits punitive damages, the rate at which they are sought
should be very low or even zero. Second is the incentive structure influ-
encing attorneys who might seek punitive awards. In states where permit-
ted, requesting punitive damages may, in a first approximation, appear to
be near costless, requiring only the addition of words to a complaint. But
some costs nevertheless likely exist. An attorney’s loss of reputation with
a judge may be a consequence of thoughtless punitive damages requests,
and monetary penalties for frivolous claims can put a hard edge on the
reputational blow. We assess these features with the primary goal of
exploring their influence on the rate of seeking punitive awards. This
lays the groundwork for the selection models explored in Part 4.6.
4.1.1. State Rules Limiting the Seeking of Punitive Damages
25 Plaintiffs generally cannot recover punitive damages unless they seek
them, and state laws differ in allowing plaintiffs to seek punitive damages.
In four states, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, andWashington, it is
generally accepted that punitive damages are not allowed.12 Even in these
states, however punitive claims can appear in cases through the application
12 In re Wintle, 781 A.2d 995, 997 (N.H. 2001), citing Aubert v. Aubert, 529A.2d 909 (1987);
Gagnard v. Baldridge, 612 So.2d 732, 736 (La.1993) (punitive damages not allowed under
Louisiana law unless provided for by statute); Corona de Camargo v. Schon, 278 Neb. 1045
(2009); Dailey v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589 (1996) (punitive damages generally
contrary to public policy).
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of federal law or other states’ laws13 or through statutes authorizing punitive
damages.14 In at least three states, Massachusetts, Michigan, and South
Dakota,15 state law restricts the availability of punitive damages but does
not prohibit them as broadly as in the four non-punitive-damages states. In
at least seven states, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota,
and Oregon, punitive damages may not be included in an initial pleading.16
Leave of court must be sought to allow an amendment to the complaint to
seek punitive damages. Thus, courts in these seven states preliminarily assess
the merits of a punitive damages claim before punitive damages can even be
sought. We expect that punitive damages will be sought less often in these
14 states. Each of these states other than New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oregon, and South Dakota have some trials in the NCSC-BJS data.
26To explore the relation between state law characteristics (prohibitions on
punitives, limitations on punitives, and pleading threshold for punitives) and
punitive damages outputs, Table 5 reports the rates of seeking and obtaining
punitive damages by state. States with less than 100 trials in the NCSC-BJS
data are combined in the table into the residual category ‘‘Other.’’ Each
state in the table is represented by at least two counties in the data.
27For states that we treat as generally prohibiting punitive damages,
only Washington is displayed in the table. New Hampshire has no
cases in the data and Louisiana and Nebraska each have less than 100
trials in the data. Combining Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington as
a group yields a punitive damages seeking rate of 2.27 percent (5 out
of 220 trials), which is statistically significantly lower than the 9.13 per-
cent rate in other states (p < 0.001). If one limits the sample to cases in
which plaintiffs won at trial, the three states have a seeking rate of
13 For example, in New Hampshire, in an action based on federal law, an insurer can be liable for
punitive damages. American Home Assurance Co. v. Fish, 451 A.2d 358, 360 (N.H. 1982).
14 For example, Louisiana authorizes exemplary damages in some cases involving drunk driving.
La. Stats. Ann. Civ. Code art. 2315.4.
15 Under Massachusetts law, punitive damages may be awarded only by statute. International
Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (1983). In Michigan, exemplary damages are compen-
sation for injury to feelings and are not used to punish. Veselenak v. Smith, 414 Mich. 567,
572–573, 327 N.W.2d 261 (1982). In South Dakota, punitive damages are available only as
provided by statute. S.D. Coded Laws x 21-1-4.
16 Fla. Stat. Ann. x 768.72; Idaho Code Ann. x 6-1604(2); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-604.1 (amend-
ment struck down in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997), but this provision
predates the invalidated amendment); Minn. Stat. Ann. x 549.191; N.D. Cent. Code x 32-03.2-
11; Kan. Stat. Ann. x 60-3703; Or. Rev. Stat. x 31.725.
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Table 5. Rates of Seeking and Obtaining Punitive Damages, by State
State
All trials
Trials won by
plaintiffs
Trials won by
plaintiffs, punitives
sought
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitive
award
N
AZ 9.0% 333 12.3% 163 25.0% 20
CA 21.0% 1,263 23.4% 636 33.8% 148
CT 10.3% 194 8.1% 111 22.2% 9
FL 3.6% 420 3.9% 257 55.6% 9
GA 18.4% 141 22.0% 91 15.8% 19
IL 2.9% 756 4.1% 418 47.1% 17
IN 2.7% 147 3.2% 95 0.0% 3
KY 7.7% 117 16.0% 50 50.0% 8
MA 1.1% 349 2.1% 97 100.0% 2
MI 0.9% 330 0.7% 143 - 0
MN 3.8% 260 4.0% 150 25.0% 4
MO 12.7% 237 11.3% 141 50.0% 14
NJ 5.2% 574 7.0% 229 20.0% 15
NY 4.1% 390 4.1% 172 16.7% 6
OH 15.6% 456 12.9% 279 44.1% 34
Other 22.8% 373 24.1% 216 21.2% 52
PA 3.6% 853 4.4% 480 31.6% 19
TX 6.5% 909 8.8% 444 56.4% 39
VA 17.7% 215 18.5% 135 44.0% 25
WA 1.9% 210 1.5% 130 0.0% 2
WI 4.0% 174 2.8% 109 100.0% 3
Total 9.0% 8,701 10.2% 4,546 35.5% 448
Note.Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were sought in all trials, the rate at which
punitive damages were sought in trials won by plaintiffs, and the rate at which punitive dam-
ages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. States
with less than 100 trials are combined into the residual category ‘‘Other.’’ Source: NCSC-BJS
2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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2.22 percent (3 out of 135 trials), significantly different from other states
at p¼ 0.001.17
28For states that we treat as restricting but not generally prohibiting
punitive damages, Massachusetts and Michigan are displayed in the
table and South Dakota has no cases in the data. Combining Massachu-
setts and Michigan yields a punitive damages seeking rate of 1.03 per-
cent (7 out of 679 trials), which is statistically significantly lower than
the 9.62 percent rate in other states (p < 0.001). If one limits the sample
to cases in which plaintiffs won at trial, the two states have a seeking rate of
1.25 percent (3 out of 240 trials), significantly different from other states at
p < 0.001.18
29For states that we treat as imposing a pleading threshold on seeking
punitive damages, Florida, Illinois, and Minnesota are displayed in the
table. North Dakota and Oregon have no cases in the data and Idaho
and Kansas have less than 100 trials in the data. Combining Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, and Minnesota as a group yields a punitive dam-
ages seeking rate of 3.37 percent (49 out of 1,452 trials), which is statisti-
cally significantly lower than the 10.07 percent rate in other states
(p < 0.001). If one limits the sample to cases in which plaintiffs won at
trial, the five states have a seeking rate of 4.08 percent (34 out of 833 trials),
significantly different from other states at p < 0.001.19
30If one combines the states with rules or statutory restrictions on punitive
damages (no punitive damages, restrictions on punitive damages, thresh-
old pleading requirement), punitive damages were sought in such states
in 2.59 percent (61 out of 2,351) of trials compared to 11.31 percent
(718 out of 6,350) trials in other states. Weighting the analysis to reflect
the differential sampling of large and small counties results in restriction
states having a seeking rate of 3.72 percent and other states having a seeking
rate of 13.71 percent. If one limits the sample to cases in which plaintiffs
won at trial, the restricting states have a seeking rate of 3.31 percent (40
out of 1,208 trials), with corresponding weighted rates of 3.60 percent and
15.45 percent, respectively. We conclude that state rules restricting punitive
17 These results differ between the 46 large counties and the 110 small counties but are in the
same direction for both groups of counties.
18 These results do not materially differ between the large counties and small counties.
19 These results differ between the 46 large counties and the 110 small counties but are in the
same direction for both groups of counties.
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damages are significantly associated with the rate at which punitive damages
are sought. This filtering mechanism is accounted for below in our second
set of regression models of whether plaintiffs obtain punitive damages after
trial.
4.1.2. State Sanction Standards
31 In addition to statutory limits on seeking punitive damages, state law or
practice may affect the seeking of punitive damages in other ways. Plaintiffs
with weak or marginal punitive damages claims may hesitate to seek them
for at least two reasons. First, an attorney who brings an objectively weak
punitive damages claims may fear a possible reputational loss with the
judge. The punitive damages claim will not only be denied but the judge
may treat other aspects of the attorney’s case with greater skepticism.
Second, the attorney may fear the less subtle risk of being sanctioned for
having brought a frivolous claim. We cannot assess the first factor but
we can attempt to account for possible fear of sanctions by exploiting
variation in state law.
32 Following Byron Keeling’s (1994) classification system of state law sanc-
tions, we divide the states into three tiers. One tier consists of states with a
high threshold for awarding sanctions. ‘‘Typically, the states that follow a
high threshold sanctions model require some kind of subjective bad
faith—or the absence of good faith—as a condition to an award of sanc-
tions. .’’ Other factors being equal, this tier might be expected to have
the highest rate of seeking punitive damages. Another tier consists of states
with a low threshold for awarding sanctions. ‘‘[U]nder a sanctions scheme
in a low threshold state, a person can be subject to sanctions if she acts
unreasonably—regardless whether she acts in subjective bad faith.’’
Other factors being equal, these states might be expected to have the lowest
rate of seeking punitive damages. A third tier consists of states with a
hybrid threshold for sanctions, a threshold that falls between the high
threshold and the low threshold states. ‘‘States that follow this model
preserve an objective standard for the imposition of sanctions, but none-
theless, they incorporate into their sanctions schemes one or more
procedural devices intended to mitigate the repressive effects of the objec-
tive standard’’ (Keeling 1994, 1095, 1103, 1111). We start with Keeling’s
original classification of states but update it to reflect changes in law since
publication of his article in 1994. These changes consist mostly of states
that have since adopted the 1993 version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
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of Civil Procedure, which reduced the perceived chilling effect on advocacy
of the 1983 version of Rule 11.20 We recognize that for some states, classifi-
cation is a judgment call and alternative classification may be reasonable.21
33This three-tier classification scheme leads to states’ sanction regimes
being classified for purposes of this article as shown in the text note
accompanying Table 6. The numerical columns in the table show the
Table 6. Classification of State Sanction Standards for Weak Claims
Threshold
for
imposing
sanctions
All trials
Trials won
by plaintiffs
Trials won
by plaintiffs,
punitives sought
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitives
sought
N
% with
punitive
award
N
High
threshold
14.4%
(17.6%)
2,329
16.4%
(20.4%)
1,156
35.1%
(32.2%)
188
Hybrid
threshold
6.2%
(9.69%)
5,930
7.1%
(10.8%)
3,111
37.0%
(26.8%)
211
Low
threshold
17.0%
(11.8%)
442
17.9%
(12.2%)
279
30.6%
(25.4%)
49
Total
9.0%
(11.7%)
8,701
10.2%
(13.1%)
4,546
35.5%
(28.5%)
48
Note.Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were sought in all trials, the rate at which
punitive damages were sought in trials won by plaintiffs, and the rate at which punitive dam-
ages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. Classi-
fication of the state sanction threshold is based on sanctions standards in effect at the time
relevant to the NCSC-BJS data. High threshold states are CA, CT, FL, ME, MA, NM, and SC.
Hybrid threshold states are AL, AZ, CO, HI, IL, IN, KY, LA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NE, NJ,
NV, NY, OH, OK, PA, RI, TN, TX, WA, WI, and WV. Low threshold states are AR, GA, IA, ID,
KS, MT, NC, and VA. Note that AK, DE, NH, ND, OR, SD, UT, VT, and WY have no cases in
the data. Figures in parentheses are based on probability weights to reflect different sampling
rates in large and small counties. Weighted frequencies not shown. Sources: NCSC-BJS 2005
Civil Justice Survey, Keeling (1994), authors’ coding.
20 Keeling 1994, 1090. Rule changes moving states closer to the standard in the 1993 version of
federal Rule 11 occurred around the time of or after Keeling’s article in several states: Dela-
ware, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. We use the sanctions standard
in effect at the time of the cases in the NCSC-BJS data. For some states, we changed Keeling’s
coding because it appeared to be in error based on the criteria for classification into the
three tiers.
21 See, for example, Keeling’s discussion of Georgia’s standard, Keeling 1994, 1106–1109, and
compare it with Eaton’s (2007) report on judges’ views of the degree of frivolous litigation
in Georgia.
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rates of seeking and obtaining punitive awards, with weighted results in
parentheses.
34 The weighted results for the relation between sanctions and seeking
punitive damages suggest that the high threshold states noticeably differ
from the hybrid and low threshold states but that no meaningful difference
exists between the hybrid threshold and low threshold states. As expected,
plaintiffs seek punitive damages at a higher rate in states with a high
threshold for awarding sanctions than in states with a hybrid threshold
or a low threshold. The rate in high threshold states is about double that
in hybrid states. Although the weighted rate of seeking punitive damages
is, surprisingly, higher in low threshold states than in hybrid threshold
states, the difference is not statistically significant.22 The rate of obtaining
punitive awards in cases won by plaintiffs does not significantly differ
across the three thresholds. We will account for the possible filtering effect
of sanction standards in regression models below.
4.2. Case Category and Locale
35 Table 3’s last two columns show heterogeneity by case category in whether
punitive damages sought are awarded. In case categories with at least ten
trials in which punitive damages were sought, award rates varied from
20 percent in motor vehicle, premises liability, and seller plaintiff cases
(7.1 percent, 10.7 percent, and 9.3 percent, respectively, weighted) to
over 60 percent in intentional tort (66.3 percent weighted), slander/libel/
defamation (hereinafter ‘‘defamation’’) (54.7 percent weighted), and con-
version (27.3 percent weighted) cases. For the case categories with at least
10 requests for punitive damages in successful trials, a test of the hypothesis
that the rate of punitive awards does not vary across category can be
rejected at p < 0.001. Intentional tort, the high-rate category with the larg-
est number of trials, obviously has an element of willful misbehavior that
would be expected to support requests for punitive damages awards. Def-
amation, another high-rate category, need not be intentional but we sus-
22 The low sanctions threshold category has eight states but two, Georgia and Virginia, dominate
the category. Those two states combine for 356 of the 442 (85.3 percent) low sanction thresh-
old trials in the data. Eaton’s survey of Georgia judges provides mixed evidence about the
rate of frivolous litigation (and thus indirectly about potentially sanctionable behavior).
Eaton reports that more than 79 percent of the judges surveyed report not seeing many friv-
olous cases but that 10 percent report that more than 20 percent of tort cases are frivolous
(2007, 446).
598 ~ Eisenberg, Heise, Waters, Wells: The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study
pect that plaintiffs upset enough to sue for defamation tend to ascribe
intentional misbehavior to the targeted defendants. The low-rate catego-
ries, such as motor vehicle, premises liability, and seller plaintiff, do not
clearly consistently involve egregious behavior warranting punitive dam-
ages and so the seeking of punitive damages in them is an important pos-
sible signal about individual cases in those case categories.
36We will further address case categories in this Part below by subdividing
them by judge and jury trials. We will also account for case categories in
Part 4’s regression models by using dummy variables for case categories,
though some reaggregation is necessary for case categories with relatively
few cases.
37Table 4 shows that punitive damage award rates varied by locale. It
is desirable to account for locale in modeling punitive damages awards.
Table 7. Rates of Seeking and Obtaining Punitive Damages, by Size of Compensatory
Award
Compensatory
award
Trials won by plaintiffs
Trials won by plaintiffs,
punitives sought
% with punitives
sought
N
% with punitive
award
N
$0 to $9,999 8.0% (14.1%) 1,052 (3,850) 21.4% (11.4%) 84 (544)
$10,000 to
$49,999
8.1% (9.5%) 1,404 (4,905) 25.7% (27.9%) 113 (451)
$50,000 to
$74,999
11.1% (14.4%) 369 (1,078) 27.5% (25.9%) 40 (154)
$75,000 to
$99,999
11.1% (16.7%) 207 (632) 28.6% (36.3%) 21 (90)
$100,000 to
$199,999
13.6% (19.6%) 428 (1,222) 47.4% (38.3%) 57 (226)
$200,000 to
$999,999
10.3% (9.3%) 623 (1,630) 42.6% (27.2%) 61 (135)
$1 million to
$9,999,999
19.8% (24.3%) 263 (601) 53.1% (56.3%) 49 (130)
$10 million
or more
25.6% (28.5%) 43 (97) 81.8% (89.8%) 11 (27)
Total 10.2% (13.1%) 4,389 (13,915) 34.9% (27.4%) 436 (1,756)
Note. Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were sought in trials won by plaintiffs, and
the rate at which punitive damages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive
damages were sought. Figures in parentheses are based on probability weights to reflect different
sampling rates in large and small counties. Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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But further subdividing the sample within locale by, for example, case cat-
egory or compensatory award level, is not useful. This is because the with-
in-locale data are too thin to support further meaningful subdivision.
Table 4 shows that only three locales, Los Angeles, Orange, and Fairfax,
had more than 20 plaintiff trial wins with punitive requests. And the resid-
ual locale of 110 smaller counties had only 97 punitive damages award
requests in plaintiff trial wins. The many locales and thinness of the data
also make it impracticable to include in Part 4’s regression models
dummy variables for each locale. We will instead account for locale (and
state) using random intercept models for our core results in Part 4.6.
4.3. Size of Compensatory Award
38 Greater harm can be expected to be associated with an increased likelihood
of a punitive award (Choi & Eisenberg 2009). Table 7 reports the relation
between the compensatory award and the rate of seeking and obtaining
punitive awards in plaintiff trial wins. The table’s first column stratifies
the sample by levels of the compensatory award. The table’s next column
shows a generally increasing rate of seeking punitive damages as the com-
pensatory award increased. The numbers not in parentheses show the raw
data and the numbers in parentheses show results weighted to account for
the differential sampling of large and small counties, a formatting conven-
tion followed in the tables that follow as well. The two lowest compensa-
tory award levels had the lowest rates of seeking punitive damages, about 8
percent (14.1 percent and 9.5 percent, weighted). The two highest levels
had seeking rates of about 20 percent or higher (24.3 percent and 28.5 per-
cent, weighted). With respect to the rate of obtaining punitive awards, the
table’s last two columns show a general pattern of increasing rates of puni-
tive awards as the compensatory award increases. The rate does not exceed
30 percent for compensatory award groups of less than $100,000 (less than
$75,000 weighted). The rate increases to over 50 percent (56.3 percent
weighted) for cases with compensatory awards of $1 million to $10 million
and exceeds 80 percent (89.8 percent weighted) for cases with compensa-
tory awards of at least $10 million.
4.4. Judge-Jury Differences
39 Differences in punitive damages awards rates between judges and juries
have been previously reported using Civil Justice Survey data (Eisenberg
et al. 2006). The 2005 data allow a more refined assessment of that issue
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based on knowledge of punitive award requests. Tables 3 and 7 suggest the
importance of accounting for case category and size of compensatory
award rates.
40Table 8 refines Table 3 by dividing the case category punitive award rates
by judge and jury trials. It limits the case categories to those with at least
five trials before judges and five trials before juries in which plaintiffs
sought punitive damages and prevailed on liability at trial. The table
shows a reasonably consistent pattern of higher punitive award rates in
jury trials. The overall difference is large, 43.2 percent (34.1 percent
weighted) compared to 25.0 percent (20.0 percent weighted), and the
Table 8. Rates of Obtaining Punitive Damages, by Case Category and Mode of Trial
Compensatory
award level
Jury trials Judge trials
Punitive award
rate
N
Punitive award
rate
N
Slander, libel,
defamation
80.0% (61.0%) 10 (38) 20.0% (20.0%) 5 (7)
Intentional tort 66.7% (66.7%) 30 (79) 62.5% (65.7%) 8 (48)
Conversion 66.7% (27.3%) 6 (21) 66.7% (27.3%) 6 (21)
Employment -
other
55.6% (42.5%) 18 (62) 0.0% (0.0%) 8 (36)
Fraud 50.0% (64.7%) 52 (207) 21.9% (17.2%) 32 (57)
Intentional/
tortious
interference
45.5% (69.4%) 11 (27) 40.0% (14.7%) 5 (19)
Buyer plaintiff
(contract)
40.0% (37.2%) 30 (176) 15.6% (14.6%) 32 (215)
Other/
unknown
contract/
commercial
37.5% (69.9%) 8 (23) 40.0% (40.0%) 5 (7)
Motor vehicle
tort
20.7% (7.1%) 58 (410) 16.7% (6.8%) 6 (21)
Seller plaintiff
(contract)
15.4% (5.1%) 13 (55) 23.5% (15.6%) 17 (36)
Total 43.2% (34.1%) 236 (1,098) 25.0% (20.0%) 124 (466)
Note. Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs
in which punitive damages were sought. Sample is limited to case categories in which punitive
damages were sought in at least five judge trials and five jury trials. Figures in parentheses are
based on probability weights to reflect different sampling rates in large and small counties.
Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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weighted jury rate exceeded the weighted judge rate in all case categories
except seller plaintiff and conversion (a tie). Although too few cases
exist in most categories for precise estimates, the overall pattern is clear
and highly statistically significant.23
41 Table 9 explores judge-jury differences by controlling for the size of the
compensatory award, again limiting the sample to case categories contain-
ing at least five efforts to obtain punitive damages for both judge and
jury trials. The table shows, for each compensatory award range, the rate
of punitive awards for judge trials and jury trials. While accounting for
compensatory awards, the pattern of higher rates of punitive awards
in jury trials is consistent for the unweighted data but less so for the
weighted data. For the unweighted data, except for the small category
Table 9. Rates of Obtaining Punitive Damages, by Compensatory Award Level and
Mode of Trial
Compensatory
award level
Jury trials Judge trials
Punitive
award rate
N
Punitive
award rate
N
$0 to $9,999 28.6% (16.1%) 49 (348) 5.3% (1.1%) 19 (124)
$10,000 to
$49,999
32.7% (38.0%) 49 (251) 19.6% (16.7%) 51 (157)
$50,000 to
$99,999
32.4% (19.1%) 34 (145) 31.3% (52.2%) 16 (83)
$100,000 to
$199,999
63.6% (59.4%) 33 (131) 31.3% (9.9%) 16 (71)
$200,000 to
$999,999
45.2% (21.4%) 31 (92) 36.4% (36.4%) 11 (15)
$1 million to
$9,999,999
58.6% (62.4%) 29 (77) 40.0% (40.0%) 5 (7)
$10 million
or more
100.0% (100%) 5 (19) 100.0% (100%) 1 (1)
Total 42.7% (32.4%) 230 (1,065) 23.7% (19.2%) 119 (459)
Note. Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs
in which punitive damages were sought. Sample is limited to case categories in which punitive
damages were sought in at least five judge trials and five jury trials. Figures in parentheses are
based on probability weights to reflect different sampling rates in large and small counties.
Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
23 A Mantel-Haenszel test of the hypothesis that the combined odds ratio across case categories
(unweighted) equals one can be rejected at p¼ 0.0003.
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above $10 million (only one judge trial and five jury trials in the included
categories), the punitive award rate in jury trials is higher after controlling
for the size of the compensatory award. For the weighted data that account
for the sample design, the rate of obtaining punitive awards was higher in
judge trials in the reasonably large category of compensatory awards ranging
from $50,000 to $99,999 and in the smaller category with awards ranging
from $200,000 to $999,999.
42Prior research suggests that jury and judge punitive award rates differ
between personal injury cases and nonpersonal injury cases. In a study
that lacked information about whether punitive damages were sought,
juries awarded punitive damages at a higher rate than judges in nonper-
sonal injury cases and judges awarded punitive damages at a higher rate
than juries in personal injury cases (Eisenberg et al. 2006). We therefore
divide the information in Table 9 into personal injury cases and nonper-
sonal injury cases. Table 10 presents the results. Panel A shows the results
for personal injury cases and panel B shows the results for nonpersonal
injury cases, again limited to case categories containing at least five efforts
to obtain punitive damages for both judge and jury trials.
43The results are consistent with results based on data that did not account
for whether punitive damages are sought. In personal injury cases, judges
awarded punitive damages at a higher rate than juries. The pattern
persisted for all compensatory award levels of $50,000 or higher, though
the relatively few judge trials suggest caution in interpreting this result.
In nonpersonal injury cases, juries awarded punitive damages at a higher
rate than judges. This pattern persisted for all compensatory award strata
except one weighted stratum. The personal injury case difference is signif-
icant at p¼ 0.061 (weighted); the nonpersonal injury case difference is sig-
nificant at p < 0.001 (weighted).
4.5. The Relation Between Seeking Rates and Obtaining Rates
44Table 4 above shows that punitive damages were sought at varying rates
across locales. One influence on the rate at which punitive damages were
awarded may be the selectivity shown by plaintiffs in seeking them. For
example, Table 4 shows that punitive damages were sought in only 1.8 per-
cent of 675 tried cases in Cook County Illinois and in 2.7 percent of 365
trials won by plaintiffs. These low punitive-seeking rates are accompanied
by a high rate, 50 percent, of obtaining punitive damages in the 10 plaintiff
trial wins in which punitive damages were sought. If plaintiffs are more
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Table 10. Rates of Obtaining Punitive Damages, by Case Compensatory Award Level,
Mode of Trial, and Personal Injury Status
A. Personal injury cases
Jury trials Judge trials
Compensatory
award level
Punitive award rate N Punitive award rate N
$0 to $9,999 32.1% (11.2%) 28 (228) 0.0% (0.0%) 2 (15)
$10,000 to
$49,999
21.1% (17.8%) 19 (100) 0.0% (0.0%) 3 (16)
$50,000 to
$99,999
44.4% (15.2%) 9 (37) 100.0% (100%) 2 (27)
$100,000 to
$199,999
62.5% (40.2%) 8 (48) 100.0% (100%) 1 (1)
$200,000 to
$999,999
22.2% (7.6%) 9 (37) 100.0% (100%) 1 (1)
$1 million to
$9,999,999
50.0% (15.8%) 4 (18) 33.3% (33.3%) 3 (4)
$10 million or
more
100.0% (100%) 1 (1) 100.0% (100%) 1 (1)
Total 34.6% (16.1%) 78 (462) 46.2% (49.0%) 13 (67)
B. Nonpersonal injury cases
Jury trials Judge trials
$0 to $9,999 23.8% (24.7%) 21 (127) 5.9% (1.3%) 17 (109)
$10,000 to
$49,999
40.0% (51.2%) 30 (152) 20.8% (18.7%) 48 (141)
$50,000 to
$99,999
28.0% (20.4%) 25 (108) 21.4% (29.2%) 14 (56)
$100,000 to
$199,999
64.0% (70.4%) 25 (84) 26.7% (8.1%) 15 (70)
$200,000 to
$999,999
54.5% (30.6%) 22 (55) 30.0% (30.0%) 10 (14)
$1 million to
$9,999,999
60.0% (76.3%) 25 (59) 50.0% (50.0%) 2 (3)
$10 million or
more
100.0% (100%) 4 (18) 0
Total 46.7% (44.8%) 152 (603) 20.8% (14.1%) 106 (392)
Note. Table shows the rate at which punitive damages were obtained in trials won by plaintiffs
in which punitive damages were sought. Sample is limited to case categories in which punitive
damages were sought in at least five judge trials and five jury trials. Figures in parentheses are
based on probability weights to reflect different sampling rates in large and small counties.
Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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selective about the cases in which they seek punitive damages, they should
be expected to obtain them at a higher rate in cases in which they seek
them. Rates of seeking punitive damages could be a function of local prac-
tice or of state laws that are more or less restrictive about the availability of
punitive damages. But the bottom line expectation is that the rate of seek-
ing punitive awards should be inversely associated with the rate at which
they are obtained.
45Figure 1 shows the relation between the seeking and obtaining rate. Each
circle in the figure corresponds to a locale’s rate of seeking punitive dam-
ages on the x-axis and to that locale’s rate of obtaining punitive damages
on the y-axis. Both rates are expressed as percents. The area of the circles is
proportional to the number of cases in which punitive damages were
sought in the locale.
46The figure confirms expectations in one respect but not in another. The
absence of circles in the figure’s upper right quadrant indicates that there
were no locales that combined a high rate of seeking punitive damages
awards with a high rate of obtaining them. If one limits the analysis to
locales with the most cases (the larger circles), in no locale did a punitive
Figure 1. Relation Between Seeking and Obtaining Punitive Damages, by Locale.
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Note. Figure shows the rate in percent at which punitive damages were sought (x-axis)
and obtained (y-axis) in trials won by plaintiffs. Each circle represents one locale’s seeking
and obtaining rates, with the largest circle representing the aggregate rate for the 110
smaller counties in the study. Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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damages seeking rate of over 30 percent correspond with an obtaining rate
of much more than 30 percent. And all of the locales with award rates of
over 60 percent had seeking rates of less than 15 percent. These results are
consistent with looser standards for seeking punitive damages resulting in
lower rates of obtaining them. But the figure also shows that the rate of
obtaining punitive damages was not always closely tied to the rate of seek-
ing them. For low-seeking-rate locales, the range of obtaining rates was
broad. In particular, several locales combined low seeking rates with low
obtaining rates, and this is true even for some reasonably large locales.
We include a variable for the rate of seeking punitive damages in the
regression models below.
4.6. Regression Models
47 To further assess the pattern of punitive awards, we employed regression
analysis for two classes of models. The first class of models assesses whether
punitive damages were awarded conditional on their having been sought
and on plaintiffs having won at trial. It does not account for the decision
whether to seek punitive damages. The second class of models is also con-
ditional on plaintiffs having won at trial but expressly assesses whether
punitive damages were sought as a function of the state law characteristics
described in Part 4.1. For both classes of models, the dependent variable in
analyzing whether punitive damages were awarded is binary—it takes on
two values that are, effectively, ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no,’’ coded as 1 or 0.
4.6.1. Multilevel Models of Whether Punitive Damages Were Awarded
48 For binary dependent variables, logistic regression is the standard modeling
method (Gelman & Hill 2007; Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000). In modeling
whether punitive damages were awarded, in addition to the factors consid-
ered above (case category, locale, compensatory award amount, judge vs.
jury trial, personal injury vs. nonpersonal injury cases, and rate of seeking
punitive damages), regressionmodels need to account for the sample design.
The sample has two distinct features that require consideration.
49 First, if one were to combine into a single model data from 7,682 trials
in the 46 large counties and 1,190 trials in the 110 smaller counties,
one should account for the differential sampling of the two groups of
counties. Accounting for the different sampling rates would be neces-
sary because the penultimate row of Table 4 above shows noticeably differ-
ent rates of punitive damages in the 110 smaller counties. In the smaller
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counties, punitive damages were sought in a higher fraction of trials and
awarded in a lower fraction of trials than they were in the larger counties.
And in most of the smaller counties, there was no case in which punitive
damages were sought. Only 36 of the 110 counties reported at least one
case with a punitive damages request. Due to the heterogeneity across
county groups, we report regression results separately for large and small
county groups.
50Second, the sample is nested in that the individual cases are clustered at
the county level and the counties are embedded in larger geographical
units, states, the laws of which vary. In this sense, the data are amenable
to using hierarchical or multilevel models that account for the structure
of the data (Gelman & Hill 2007).
51Table 11 reports multilevel logistic regression models of whether puni-
tive damages were awarded in cases in which punitive damages were
sought and plaintiffs won. We limit the individual case category dummy
variables to case categories with at least five cases of punitive damages
sought in both large and small counties. Other case categories are com-
bined into the residual category ‘‘Other.’’ Models (1), (3), and (5) show
results for large counties and models (2), (4), and (6) show results for
small counties. To facilitate judge and jury trial comparisons, models (3)
and (4) are limited to case categories with at least five cases in which puni-
tive damages were sought in both judge trials and jury trials. Models (5)
and (6) further limit the sample to cases not involving personal injury.
52A consistent result across the models is the significant association
between the compensatory award amount and whether a punitive award
was given. In model (6), with only 52 observations, the compensatory
award coefficient is not significant but remains positive and large. The
results by case category are somewhat inconsistent across the large and
small groups of counties. The significantly reduced rate of punitive dam-
ages in motor vehicle cases (compared to the reference category of all other
case categories) is attributable to the small counties as indicated by com-
paring models (1) and (2). The coefficient for the intentional tort category
is much larger for the small counties.
53A reasonably consistent result is the increased rate of punitive awards in
jury-tried cases. It is statistically significant in the large county models and
substantial although insignificant in the smaller county models. The large-
county models that include a jury trial dummy variable suggest that the
case-category effects may be collinear with the jury trial effects or that
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Table 11. Multilevel Regression Models of Whether Punitive Damages Were Awarded
Explanatory
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample
Case categories with
at least five claims in
both judge and
jury trials
Nonpersonal
injury cases
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Compensatory 0.559*** 1.410** 0.518*** 0.914* 0.601*** 0.987
award (log 10) (0.132) (0.718) (0.152) (0.523) (0.191) (0.764)
Motor vehicle 0.148 4.321** 1.232 0.495
tort (0.434) (2.099) (0.886) (1.474)
Intentional tort 1.502*** 4.355* 0.471 0.424
(0.452) (2.319) (0.742) (0.796)
Fraud 0.019 0.319 0.309
(0.324) (0.379) (0.375)
Buyer plaintiff 0.094 0.319 0.291
(contract) (0.437) (0.481) (0.477)
Employment- 0.274 0.126 0.162
other (0.509) (0.564) (0.553)
Punitive seek 0.011 0.017
rate (0.015) (0.014)
Jury 0.914*** 0.741 0.867** 2.086
(0.318) (0.908) (0.339) (1.389)
Personal injury 0.614 1.182
(0.784) (0.757)
Constant 3.369*** 8.101** 3.228*** 5.638** 3.532*** 7.089*
(0.712) (3.716) (0.859) (2.588) (0.967) (3.942)
Observations 342 94 264 85 206 52
Number of
states
21 25 21 24 18 18
Number of
counties
42 36 40 32 33 24
Prob. > chi-
squared
<0.001 0.071 <0.001 0.115 0.003 0.162
(continued)
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the jury trial variable is not exogenous. No case category is statistically sig-
nificant once one includes the jury trial dummy variable, as in models (3)
and (5). Model (5) confirms the finding of a higher punitive damages
award rate in jury trials in nonpersonal injury cases.
54To visually assess the probability of a punitive award as a function of the
compensatory award, we used logistic regression on the combined large and
small county samples and used probability weights to account for the differ-
ential sampling rates. The model included only the compensatory award as
an explanatory variable and clustered the standard errors by locale. The
resulting linear predictions and 95 percent prediction bands for judge and
jury trials are shown in Figure 2. The x-axis is the amount of the compen-
satory award in a case, employing a logarithmic (base 10) scale. The y-axis is
the linear prediction of a punitive damages award that the regression model
indicated was associated with the corresponding compensatory award. Note
that the data are thin for the high compensatory award levels for judge trials.
The overlapping of the prediction bands is evidence, also suggested by some
Table 11. (Continued)
Explanatory
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample
Case categories with
at least five claims in
both judge and
jury trials
Nonpersonal
injury cases
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
% correctly
classified
68.1% 94.7% 72.0% 85.9% 67.5% 92.3%
Reduction in
error
16.2% 77.3% 29.5% 42.9% 13.0% 75.0%
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent variable is
whether punitive damages were awarded. Multilevel models are used with random intercepts
for locale and state. Sample is limited to trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were
sought. Models with jury trial dummy variables are limited to case categories in which punitive
damages were sought in at least five judge trials and five jury trials. Large counties are 46 of the
most populous counties. Small counties are 110 smaller counties but the smaller number of
counties in the table reflects the fact that many small counties had no case with a punitive
award request. The reference category for case categories is the aggregate, residual category
‘‘Other.’’ The ‘‘Reduction in error’’ reports the reduction in the percent of classes erroneously
classified (based on a cutoff probability of 0.5) compared to a model that always predicts
no award of punitive damages. Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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mixed earlier results, that caution is needed in interpreting our findings of
judge-jury differences.
4.6.2. Selection Models of the Decision to Seek Punitive Damages and Whether
Punitive Damages Were Awarded
55 Part 4.1 shows that the rate of seeking punitive damages is not uniform
across states. State laws and procedural rules restricting punitive damages’
availability are strongly associated with whether punitive damages are
sought. To account for the influence of state law on whether plaintiffs
sought punitive damages, we employ Heckman selection models to
model the decision to seek punitive damages simultaneously with whether
punitive damages were awarded. For purposes of the selection models, the
state laws and rules addressed above have the useful feature that they likely
influence the decision whether to seek punitive damages but, once puni-
tives have been sought, they have no direct influence on whether punitive
damages were awarded. We add to the selection stage dummy variables for
case categories. We also include in some models a dummy variable for
Figure 2. Linear Prediction and 95% Prediction Bands of Punitive Award, by
Compenstory Level & Trial Mode.
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Note. Linear predictions were obtained using separate logistic regression models for
judge and jury trials. Each model had only the compensatory award as an explanatory var-
iable and was weighted to reflect the differential sampling of large and small counties.
Sample is limited to trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought.
Source: NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey.
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whether the trial was a jury trial. We restrict the sample to cases in which
plaintiffs won at trial and again report results separately for large and small
counties.24
56Table 12 reports the results. As in Table 11, we report results separately
for large and small counties. Models (1), (3), and (5) show results for large
counties and models (2), (4), and (6) show results for small counties. To
facilitate judge and jury trial comparisons, models (3) and (4) are limited
to case categories with at least five cases in which punitive damages were
sought in both judge trials and jury trials. Models (3) and (4) also include
a jury trial dummy variable in the award equation. Models (5) and (6) are
the same as models (3) and (4) except that they include the jury dummy
variable in the selection equation. In models (3) to (6), we aggregate the
case category dummy variables in the award equation to match the catego-
ries in Table 11. Other case categories are combined into the residual ref-
erence category. The case category dummies are not as reaggregated in the
selection equation, where there are more observations.
57The correlation between the residuals in the award and selection equa-
tions, as measured by the parameter r, is not significant in any model. So
the selection analysis provides no evidence questioning the single-equation
probability-of-award results in Table 11. And the results are reasonably
consistent with those in Table 11. In the award equation, the coefficient
for the compensatory award is always positive and significant for the
large counties, and marginally significant or of greater magnitude for the
small counties. The jury dummy variable is positive and significant or mar-
ginally significant in the award equation. In results not reported here, in
models limited to nonpersonal injury cases, the results are essentially the
same as in Table 11’s models (5) and (6).
58Table 12’s selection equations confirm that state laws regulating punitive
damages are substantially associated with the rate at which punitive dam-
ages are sought. With one exception, all of the state law variables behave as
expected. States that effectively disallow punitive damages have a lower
probability of a punitive damages request, as do state laws that restrict
punitive damages or impose a permission-to-plead requirement. States
with high sanction thresholds have a higher probability of a punitive dam-
24 We do not include in the award equation the rate at which punitive damages were sought.
This variable was insignificant in Table 11 and is insignificant in selection models not reported
here.
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Table 12. Selection Models of Whether Punitive Damages Were Awarded
Explanatory
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample
Case categories
with at least five
claims in both
judge and jury
trials
Jury dummy variable
in models (3) and
(4) selection
equation
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Award Equation
Compensatory 0.307*** 0.446* 0.255** 0.354 0.257** 0.392
award (log 10) (0.091) (0.236) (0.129) (0.252) (0.127) (0.264)
Motor vehicle 0.016 0.575 0.090 0.843 0.071 0.669
tort (0.314) (0.601) (0.348) (0.589) (0.368) (0.654)
Intentional tort 0.923*** 1.457** 0.495 1.298 0.507 1.714**
(0.311) (0.675) (0.351) (0.877) (0.356) (0.769)
Fraud 0.001 1.168 0.261 0.728 0.258 1.148*
(0.150) (0.731) (0.172) (0.712) (0.173) (0.684)
Buyer plaintiff 0.076 0.385 0.208 0.328 0.205 0.644
(contract) (0.200) (0.603) (0.217) (0.560) (0.217) (0.582)
Employment- 0.166 5.016*** 0.129 7.056*** 0.122
other (0.318) (0.398) (0.336) (1.530) (0.341)
Jury 0.502* 0.856** 0.464* 0.785*
(0.263) (0.376) (0.269) (0.418)
Constant 2.000*** 2.756 1.491** 2.516 1.481** 3.213
(0.581) (1.876) (0.739) (1.828) (0.750) (1.992)
Selection Equation
Compensatory 0.133*** 0.055 0.154*** 0.116 0.138*** 0.061
award (log 10) (0.044) (0.0904) (0.044) (0.094) (0.042) (0.096)
State disallows 0.822*** 0.246 1.083*** 1.057***
punitives (0.112) (0.503) (0.124) (0.117)
State restricts 1.727*** 1.804*** 1.854***
punitives (0.233) (0.416) (0.415)
Permission to 0.523*** 1.046*** 0.575*** 0.974** 0.592*** 1.007**
plead punitives
required
(0.151) (0.374) (0.168) (0.426) (0.173) (0.414)
High sanctions 0.408*** 0.489* 0.289** 0.610** 0.289** 0.670**
threshold (0.128) (0.290) (0.138) (0.307) (0.140) (0.289)
Low sanctions 0.859*** 0.187 0.796*** 0.090 0.756*** 0.143
threshold (0.138) (0.205) (0.147) (0.224) (0.148) (0.229)
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Table 12. (Continued)
Explanatory
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample
Case categories
with at least five
claims in both
judge and jury
trials
Jury dummy variable
in models (3) and
(4) selection
equation
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Motor vehicle 1.431*** 0.546 1.444*** 1.072*** 1.471*** 1.341***
tort (0.183) (0.355) (0.182) (0.372) (0.185) (0.371)
Premises liability 1.439*** 1.097*
(0.233) (0.604)
Prod liability - 1.498***
other (0.469)
Malpractice - 1.073*** 0.568
medical/dental (0.250) (0.459)
Other 0.880*** 0.207
negligence/
unknown tort
(0.257) (0.453)
Fraud 0.074 0.590 0.0840 0.0416 0.022 0.001
(0.204) (0.419) (0.205) (0.423) (0.213) (0.417)
Seller plaintiff 1.263*** 1.005*** 1.288*** 1.559*** 1.157*** 1.302***
(contract) (0.177) (0.302) (0.180) (0.338) (0.180) (0.343)
Buyer plaintiff 0.615*** 0.214 0.619*** 0.312 0.552*** 0.205
(contract) (0.196) (0.347) (0.199) (0.338) (0.199) (0.361)
Employment - 0.245 0.364
discrimination (0.257) (0.740)
Employment - 0.191 0.443 0.196 0.114 0.164 0.0512
other (0.207) (0.498) (0.205) (0.502) (0.202) (0.531)
Rental/lease 0.913***
agreement (0.251)
Other 0.323* 0.069 0.0321 0.152 0.028 0.155
(0.179) (0.413) (0.183) (0.433) (0.172) (0.442)
Jury 0.238** 0.687***
(0.111) (0.227)
Constant 1.171*** 0.975* 1.200*** 0.758 1.305*** 0.912
(0.215) (0.530) (0.226) (0.542) (0.233) (0.557)
q (arctangent) 0.055 0.216 0.220 0.427 0.224 0.211
(0.172) (0.592) (0.219) (0.476) (0.227) (0.559)
(continued)
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ages request than states with a hybrid sanctions threshold, the reference
category for sanctions. In small counties, states with a high sanctions
threshold have a higher probability of a punitive damages award request
compared to states with a low sanctions threshold.
59 The one initially puzzling result is that, in the large county models, states
with a high sanctions threshold did not have a higher probability of seeking
a punitive award than states with a low sanctions threshold. This result
appears to be a consequence of differences between large and small coun-
ties in Georgia and Virginia. These two states combine for 85.3 percent of
the low sanctions threshold trials in the data (see note 22 above). For the
sample of large counties, Table 4 above shows that Georgia and Virginia
are represented by Fulton County Superior Court (Atlanta) and Fairfax
County (in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area), respectively. These
counties differ significantly in the punitive damages seeking rate from
other counties in the same states. In Fulton County, 32.5 percent (13 of
40) of the trials contained a punitive damages request compared to 12.9
Table 12. (Continued)
Explanatory
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample
Case categories
with at least five
claims in both
judge and jury
trials
Jury dummy variable
in models (3) and
(4) selection
equation
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Large
counties
Small
counties
Wald test of
independence
of equations
(prob. > chi-
squared)
0.751 0.737 0.314 0.370 0.324 0.706
Observations 3,739 640 2,824 546 2,824 546
Note. Standard errors (clustered on county) in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Dependent variable in award equation is whether punitive damages were awarded. Dependent
variable in selection equation is whether punitive damages were sought. Sample is limited to
trials won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. Models with jury trial
dummy variables are limited to case categories in which punitive damages were sought in at
least five judge trials and five jury trials. Large counties are 46 of the most populous counties.
Small counties are 110 smaller counties but many small counties had no case with a punitive
award request. The reference category for case categories is the aggregate, residual category
‘‘Other.’’ Cells with blank entries reflect either jury dummy variable being omitted from the
equation or variables with too few observations for stable estimates. In the latter case, case
category dummy variables were reaggregated into larger residual categories. Sources:
NCSC-BJS 2005 Civil Justice Survey; Keeling (1994), authors’ coding.
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percent (13 of 101) of the trials in other Georgia sites, a difference statis-
tically significant at p¼ 0.014. In Fairfax County, 20.9 percent (34 of 163)
of the trials contained a punitive damages request compared to 7.7 percent
(4 of 52) in other Virginia sites, a difference statistically significant at
p¼ 0.036. So the regression models’ low sanctions threshold results for
large counties are likely telling more of a story of the differences between
Georgia and Virginia counties than about sanctions generally.
5. DISCUSSION
60One key finding is the surprisingly low rate at which punitive damages
were sought. As noted above, some of our civil procedure colleagues casu-
ally forecast that seeking punitive damages would be overwhelming com-
mon. Yet the rate of seeking punitive damages in tried cases was only 11.5
(weighted). Nontrivial portions of the variation in the rates of seeking
punitive awards are explained by state law variation in access to punitive
damages.
61The results are consistent with Table 1 above showing that Vidmar and
Rose, using a jury verdict reporter, reported only 23.2 Florida cases per
year as submitting punitive damages issue to juries. Antolini’s results in
Hawaii varied by adjudicatory forum. The rate of seeking punitive damages
there seemed higher than the rates in this study. But note that Table 4 shows
that the rate of seeking punitive awards in Honolulu, the only Hawaii venue
in the 2005 data, was 22.2 percent, above the average rate in other counties.
62One question is whether the seeking rate differs in cases that do not
reach trial. As the Supreme Court observed in Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, the available evidence does not support substantially different
rates in cases that settle.25 As noted above, Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico
report an overall seeking rate of 14.7 percent in a comprehensive study
of Georgia tort cases. The rate for all 141 cases across all Georgia sites
in the 2005 data studied here was 18.4 percent. If anything, this suggests
that punitive damages were sought at slightly higher rates in tried cases
than in cases that did not reach trial. Herbert Kritzer and Frances Zemans
(1998) similarly found little evidence of a settlement effect.26 This restraint
25 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2625 n.15 (2008).
26 Kritzer & Zemans (1998, 160): ‘‘with perhaps one exception, what little systematic evidence
we could find does not support the notion’’ (emphasis deleted).
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by lawyers in seeking punitive damages has not heretofore been so broadly
documented.
63 A second key finding is that the punitive award rate was substantial in
cases won by plaintiffs in which punitive damages were sought. The sub-
stantial rate contrasts with low rates of punitive awards in previous data
sets lacking information about cases in which punitive damages were
sought. The finding of substantial punitive award rates in cases in which
they were sought is consistent with the limited prior reports of punitive
damages award rates.
64 Table 1 above shows that Vidmar and Rose also found that punitive
damages awards were not rare in cases in which the issue of punitive
damages was submitted to juries. The table’s last row shows that, over
the course of a decade, the possibility of punitive damages was submitted
to juries in an average of 23.2 cases per year, and that juries awarded
punitive damages in an average of 20.8 of those cases per year. This is
an overall average of punitive damages being awarded when submitted
in 89.7 percent. Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth similarly reported
a high rate of obtaining punitive awards in medical malpractice cases.
The Vidmar study of North Carolina medical malpractice cases, dis-
cussed in Part 2, yielded few punitive award cases. But the rate of punitive
awards was not materially different from the rate across the range of
punitive award cases in the 2005 Civil Justice Survey data. Our estimates
of the rate of punitive awards in Antolini’s Hawaii data yielded a state
court estimated rate of 37 percent, similar to that found in this study
of state courts.
65 A third key finding is the strong association between the size of the com-
pensatory award and the award of punitive damages. Other studies have
not stratified by the size of the compensatory award, so direct comparisons
of rates by award levels are not feasible. The high rate of punitive awards in
the Vidmar-Rose Florida study is similar to the 88.9 percent rate at which
punitive damages were awarded in cases in which they were sought in the
2005 Civil Justice Survey data when the compensatory award exceeded $10
million. But the amounts at stake in the Vidmar and Rose data were con-
siderably smaller. The median total award in their data was about $612,000
and the median punitive award was about $152,000 (Vidmar & Rose 2001,
501). Their high rate of obtaining punitive awards in lower stakes cases
may be a consequence of the filtering of cases by the jury verdict reporter
they relied on.
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66We estimated in Part 2 that Vidmar’s North Carolina medical malprac-
tice study showed about a 33 to 40 percent chance of an award of punitive
damages in medical malpractice cases from 1984 to 1990. This is not
inconsistent with the rate found here for fairly low compensatory award
cases. The North Carolina medical verdicts included only 3 of 21 cases
with awards of $1 million or more and no cases with compensatory awards
of $10 million or more (Vidmar 1995, 26–27 (table 3.1)).
67A fourth finding of interest is the variation across judge and jury trials.
The findings here confirm prior findings of an overall higher rate of puni-
tive awards in jury trials, with the previously noted qualification that the
relative rates flip when one moves from nonpersonal injury cases to per-
sonal injury cases (Eisenberg et al. 2006).
68The judge-jury findings are the most puzzling of our results. The low
punitive-seeking rate is surprising but reasonably consistent with prior
studies other than Priest’s Alabama results. Associations between the pres-
ence of a punitive award and both case categories and compensatory award
levels are consistent with a punitive damages framework in which more
egregious behavior is more likely to elicit punishment. The judge-jury dif-
ferences, in contrast, have no such simple explanation. The implausibility
of judges being more sympathetic to punitive awards than juries in per-
sonal injury cases leads us to suspect that the judge-jury difference in
rates is at least partly attributable to how the parties select cases for routing
to judge or jury trial,27 though this suggestion requires further exploration.
We also note the departures from amonolithic judge-jury pattern evidenced
by some compensatory award strata have higher weighted punitive award
rates in judge trials in Table 9 and by the crossing of lines in Figure 2.
6. CONCLUSION
69The addition to the 2005 Civil Justice Survey of information about whether
punitive damages were sought transforms the picture of punitive damages
in state courts. Punitive damages were rarely sought in tried cases, were
frequently awarded when requested, and were significantly associated
with the level of the compensatory award. None of these results has been
27 See Clermont & Eisenberg 1992, explaining higher plaintiff win rate in judge trials in products
liability and medical malpractice cases as being partly attributable to the routing of cases
between judges and juries.
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previously reported in such a comprehensive sample. Both the traditional,
casual view that punitive damages are regularly sought, and the empirically-
based view that punitive damages are rarely awarded, and therefore
difficult to model, have to be reassessed in light of the 2005 data. These
data suggest a heretofore undocumented regularity in the rate at which
punitive damages have been awarded.
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